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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS (RET.) 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges1 that the right to 
marry a person of the same sex is an aspect of liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is significant, not only for 
persons invoking that right but also for scholars interested in the development 
of constitutional law. Two aspects of the decision clarify our understanding of 
the meaning of the Constitution. First, the “original intent” of the Framers and 
the original public understanding of the constitutional text do not always 
identify the current meaning of its provisions; and second, the rejection of 
Lochner v. New York,2 while broadening the power of government to regulate 
economic affairs, left intact the underlying doctrine of substantive due process. 
Most scholars agree that a study of the original intent of the Framers or the 
original public understanding of the Constitution’s words should play a role in 
determining the meaning of its text. Some of those scholars also believe that 
the meaning of constitutional text may not be changed without following the 
procedure for amending the Constitution set forth in Article V. Indeed, I think 
that is the central predicate of the “originalist” school of constitutional 
interpretation.3 Because I think it so unlikely that the Framers or the public at 
the time of the Framing believed that States could not limit the right to marry 
to heterosexual couples, it seems clear that the majority’s decision in 
Obergefell implicitly rejected the basic premise undergirding the originalist 
view of constitutional interpretation. 
Indeed, the Obergefell majority not only rejected original intent as the sole 
benchmark for constitutional meaning but also suggested that the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment intentionally crafted that provision in broad terms 
to guard against such static interpretation. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy explained: 
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its 
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 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 3 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 411, 418 (2013) (“[T]he proper way to change ‘this Constitution’ is provided in 
Article V. Judges are not allowed to update the text of the Constitution by changing the 
meaning it had at the time of enactment.”); Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the 
Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1672 (2013) (“To an 
originalist . . . the Constitution can be changed when the people collectively act to change 
it, but the people must act in compliance with the original meaning of Article V—the 
constitutional text that dictates the procedures for effectuating constitutional change.”); 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing constitutional amendment 
process as the appropriate response to the majority’s observation that the Framers “did not 
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions” (quoting id. at 2598 
(majority opinion)). 
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dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting 
the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new 
insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a 
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.4  
The majority rightly noted, moreover, the circularity that would result if 
the Constitution’s guarantees of liberty and equality were limited to the 
Framers’ conception of those principles: “If rights were defined by who 
exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own 
continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”5 
In addition to rejecting the originalist method of constitutional 
interpretation, Obergefell reaffirmed the post-Lochner doctrine of substantive 
due process. The principal dissent in the case, written by Chief Justice 
Roberts, criticized the majority for relying on that doctrine, which produced 
the decisions in Lochner6 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.7 According to the 
dissent, the majority’s analysis evoked the flawed logic of those decisions by 
“confus[ing] [the Justices’] own preferences with the requirements of the law” 
and inappropriately constitutionalizing a particular “theory of marriage” 
without sufficient regard for whether the right is “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.”8 The Court’s subsequent rejection of Lochner 
and Dred Scott, the dissent argued, illustrates that the majority’s application of 
the substantive due process doctrine was unsound.9 
The dissent’s view wrongly assumes that the Court’s cases overruling 
Lochner called into question the entire doctrine of substantive due process, 
whereas in fact those decisions merely rejected its application to economic 
                                                                                                                     
 4 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 5 Id. at 2602; see also id. at 2603 (“[I]n interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Court has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified 
inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and 
unchallenged.”). 
 6 Id. at 2615–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s approach has no basis 
in principle or tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that 
characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York.”). In Lochner, the Court 
invalidated a New York law barring bakery employees from working more than sixty hours 
per week on the ground that the law “necessarily interferes with the right of contract 
between the employer and employees,” which is “part of the liberty of the individual 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 7 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S CONST. amend. XIV. In Dred Scott, the Court struck down 
the Missouri Compromise, reasoning that “an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of 
the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States . . . could hardly be dignified with 
the name of due process of law.” Id. at 450. 
 8 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12, 2618 (Robert, C.J., dissenting) (third quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
 9 Id. at 2618. 
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regulation.10 The dissent cites Justice Holmes’s famous observation that the 
“Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” 
or, for that matter, any other theory of economic regulation.11 Few today 
would dispute that proposition; as I wrote in dissent in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, “[e]ver since ‘the deviant economic due process cases [were] 
repudiated,’ our doctrine has steered away from ‘laws that touch economic 
problems, business affairs, or social conditions.’”12 But the rejection of the 
doctrine’s application to economic regulation does not diminish the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of certain “especially significant personal interests” 
pertaining to, for example, “marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education.”13 
The Obergefell dissenters, moreover, declined to mention that, with the 
exception of Justice Thomas, they had relied on substantive due process to 
support their dubious holding that the Second Amendment imposes limits on 
the States’ power to regulate handguns in McDonald.14 It seems bizarre to 
conclude that a right to own handguns is “among those fundamental rights 
                                                                                                                     
 10 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“We have returned to the 
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic 
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies . . . .”); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. 
Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) (“We are not concerned . . . with the 
wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation [directed at business practices]. 
Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice which ‘should be left where . . . it 
was left by the Constitution—to the States and to Congress.’” (third alteration in original) 
(quoting Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 375 (1928) (Stone, J., dissenting))); W. Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (“[I]f such laws [pertaining to economic 
regulation] ‘have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither 
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied.’” (quoting 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934))). 
 11 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lochner, 198 
U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 12 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 879 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 761 
(Souter, J., concurring in judgment); and then quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 482 (1965)). 
 13 Id. (second quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)); see also id. at 879–80 
(“[Substantive due process] safeguards, most basically, ‘the ability independently to define 
one’s identity,’ ‘the individual’s right to make certain unusually important decisions that 
will affect his own, or his family’s, destiny,’ and the right to be respected as a human 
being. Self-determination, bodily integrity, freedom of conscience, intimate relationships, 
political equality, dignity and respect—these are the central values we have found implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.” (citations omitted) (first quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984); and then quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., 523 F.2d 
716, 719 (7th Cir. 1975))); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (“The fundamental liberties 
protected by [the Due Process] Clause . . . extend to certain personal choices central to 
individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity 
and beliefs.”). 
 14 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767. 
916 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:5 
necessary to our system of ordered liberty” but that the right to choose one’s 
spouse is not.15 
The right to marry—like the right to decide whether to have an abortion, 
or the right to control the education of your children—fits squarely within the 
category of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Obergefell majority, furthermore, correctly framed the right 
to marriage in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty 
rather than “privacy.” In my view, Justice Stewart’s reliance on “the ‘liberty’ 
that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” in 
Roe v. Wade,16 and Justices Harlan’s and White’s reliance on the substantive 
content of the word “liberty” in Griswold v. Connecticut,17 were far better 
explanations for those two correct decisions than the concept of “privacy” 
developed by the majority opinions. So, too, in Obergefell, I am persuaded that 
a fair reading of the word “liberty” best explains the real basis for the Court’s 
holding in the marriage case. 
While “privacy” concerns “the individual’s interest in protection from 
unwarranted public attention, comment, or exploitation,” the liberty protected 
by substantive due process goes to “the individual’s right to make certain 
unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his family’s, 
destiny.”18 Such fundamental decisions surely include the choice of marital 
partner. 
The Obergefell dissenters objected that same-sex marriage could not be 
protected by substantive due process because it lacks deep roots in this 
Nation’s history and was unheard-of by the generation that wrote and ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment.19 As Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent: 
When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited 
marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted the 
constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases. When it comes to 
determining the meaning of a vague constitutional provision—such as ‘due 
process of law’ or ‘equal protection of the laws’—it is unquestionable that the 
People who ratified that provision did not understand it to prohibit a practice 
                                                                                                                     
 15 Id. at 778. 
 16 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 17 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500–01 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 502–03 
(White, J., concurring in judgment). 
 18 Fitzgerald, 523 F.2d at 719. 
 19 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The Court today not only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition 
but actively repudiates it, preferring to live only in the heady days of the here and now.”). I 
have previously noted my rejection of this narrow historical test. See McDonald, 561 U.S. 
at 875–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] rigid historical methodology . . . is unfaithful to 
the expansive principle Americans laid down when they ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment and to the level of generality they chose when they crafted its language; it 
promises an objectivity it cannot deliver and masks the value judgments that pervade any 
analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are sufficiently ‘rooted’ . . . .”). 
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that remained both universal and uncontroversial in the years after 
ratification. We have no basis for striking down a practice that is not 
expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, and that bears the 
endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use 
dating back to the Amendment’s ratification.20 
Of course, as many scholars have pointed out, under this logic the Equal 
Protection Clause would not prohibit racial segregation, which remained 
widespread after enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.21 More generally, 
as I observed in McDonald, this approach to constitutional interpretation 
threatens to “countenance[] the most revolting injustices in the name of 
continuity, for we must never forget that not only slavery but also the 
subjugation of women and other rank forms of discrimination are part of our 
history.”22 The Obergefell majority rightly recognized that the right to 
personal choice regarding marriage is “inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy” and thus essential to our scheme of ordered liberty—regardless of 
whether one would choose to marry a person of the same or opposite sex.23 
                                                                                                                     
 20 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 21 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 75–76 (1990) (“The inescapable fact is that those who ratified the 
amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any aspect of 
life.”); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 213, 252–53 (1991) (“Virtually nothing in the congressional debates suggests that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit school segregation, while 
contemporaneous state practices render such an interpretation fanciful . . . . To strike down 
public school segregation in Brown, therefore, required the Justices consciously to burst 
asunder the shackles of original intent.”). But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and 
the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952–53 (1995) (quoting Klarman, Bork, 
and others but arguing nonetheless that “the belief that school segregation does in fact 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment was held during the years immediately following 
ratification by a substantial majority of political leaders who had supported the 
Amendment” (footnote omitted)). 
 22 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 876 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 23 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
